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(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

3 NOVEMBER 1967
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)



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VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

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NOTE: In the graphic showing the North Vietnamese ground order of battle opposite page A-8 of the Intelligence Summary of 2 November, the figure for total "Out of Country Regular Ground Forces" in South Vietnam should be 51,300 rather than 31,300. ~~(SECRET)~~

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EASTERN

Non Responsive Record

NORTH VIETNAM

Non Responsive Record

SOUTH VIETNAM

Non Responsive Record

Non Responsive Record

Cambodia To Receive More Soviet Military Aid

The USSR plans to deliver a large quantity of military items to Cambodia early this month, according to a well-informed source. He says that anti-aircraft guns, a battery of artillery, and some MIG-17s will be sent to Phnom Penh, probably before retiring Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Ratanov leaves there. The Soviets have given military aid to Cambodia in excess of \$6 million since 1963.

Ratanov's replacement, the notorious but capable Sergey Kudryavtsev, who is primarily European-oriented, seems to have been given an unusual assignment. His appointment might be connected with a Soviet attempt to capitalize on the low state of Sino-Cambodian relations. Plans to deliver more military aid at this time may also be part of such an effort.

On the other hand, Chief-of-State Sihanouk announced on 1 November that Premier Chou En-lai had sent him a letter which expressed China's desire for a reconciliation with Cambodia. Sihanouk asked his people to "forget past suspicion" and again consider China as a great friend -- in mid-October he had said he was cutting off aid from Peiping because "it is conditional and the price could be Cambodia's independence."

Peiping was believed to have promised Cambodia additional aid last June but evidently has yet to follow up on the matter. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~


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
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NOTES

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**VIETNAM
AND
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

R South Vietnam Situation Report

Fighting in the Loc Ninh area of Binh Long Province continued on 2 November for the fifth day. Allied ground troops, supported by artillery and air strikes, forced Viet Cong-North Vietnamese maneuver elements to withdraw and inflicted heavy casualties. It is estimated that more than 830 Communists have been killed during the fighting, which has continued sporadically since early on 29 October; the enemy may call off further attempts to overrun Loc Ninh District Town and the US Army Special Forces Camp.

Two battalions of the 273d Viet Cong Regiment were contacted on the 29th and US Army troops clashed with elements of the 165th NVA Regiment the following day. The 272d VC Regiment has also reportedly been active during the five-day battle. The 272d and 273d are subordinate to the 9th VC Division, while the 165th is controlled by the 7th NVA Division. If all subordinates of the three regiments were in the area, the number of troops deployed was about 5,000.

(S) There are increasing indications that subordinates of the NVA B-3 Front in the central highlands are preparing for offensive operations against Allied units and installations near the Dak To US Army Special Forces Camp in Kontum Province. A 1st NVA Division subordinate, probably the 635th Battalion of the 32d Regiment, has been reporting on friendly helicopter movements and artillery fire and has indicated that reconnaissance units are having trouble collecting reliable intelligence on US and ARVN forces. Sec. 3.3(b) (1) elements of the 32d NVA Regiment are probably concentrated west-southwest of Dak To; they may be preparing attack and ambush positions.

In the Mekong Delta, about 12 miles northwest of Can Tho, 10 rounds of 81-mm mortar fire hit a district town, and a ground attack was then launched against an ARVN Ranger unit. The enemy force employed small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and

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75-mm recoilless rifles, while artillery and gunships supported the friendly forces during the four-hour engagement. The enemy lost 30 killed and eight weapons; friendly losses were two killed and 18 wounded (11 civilians).

Political

According to the press on 1 November a 28-year old Buddhist nun committed suicide by fire in Nha Trang in protest against President Nguyen Van Thieu. This is the fifth fiery suicide by militant Buddhists since the 2d of October to protest government recognition of the moderate followers of Thich Tam Chau as the official Buddhist organization, vis-a-vis the militant group led by Thich Tri Quang.

The Liberation Radio (~~VC clandestine~~) in a Vietnamese language broadcast at 1400Z on the 2d of November in South Vietnam announced it was going to release three US Army prisoners of war (PWs). The broadcast claimed that the three PWs had sincerely repented the crimes they had committed against the South Vietnamese people. It was announced that one of the PWs has been a captive since 29 October 1963, another since 21 July 1964, while the third was a more recent captive. This appears to be another VC ploy to exploit to the fullest extent the propaganda to be gained from their "humane and lenient policy."

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MERCHANT SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM


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NR Status of Soviet, East European, and Free World Shipping to North Vietnam

Four Soviet, one Polish, and three Free World merchant ships (one tanker, six dry cargo units, and a salvage tug) are in the Haiphong port area. Two Soviet and two Free World freighters are at minor ports northeast of Haiphong. Eleven Soviet merchantmen are en route to North Vietnam, and 17 others (six Soviet, nine East European, and two Free World) are scheduled for voyages.

A second Soviet ship with a cargo of flour from Vladivostok has been diverted from Haiphong to Hon Gai. Unloading there is apparently a new attempt by North Vietnam to speed vital foodstuffs to the consumer. Until last month, Cam Pha and Hon Gai had been used almost exclusively as coal loading ports. Cargo unloaded at these ports may be moved over highways and inland coastal waterways; the flour will probably be moved via the waterways.

<u>NAME OF SHIP</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>GRT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TAT*</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>En Route</u>					
ALEKSANDR GERTSEN	Soviet	11,287	CG*	ETA Djakarta	3 Nov
ANIVA	Soviet	3,330	TK*	Arr Hong Kong	29 Oct
ARAKS	Soviet	3,330	TK	ETA Haiphong	5 Nov
ARKADY GAYDAR (LH)*	Soviet	11,287	CG	ETA Haiphong	20 Nov
MARGELAN (LH)	Soviet	10,107	CG	W. coast Africa	2 Nov
MOLOCHANSK (LH)	Soviet	10,107	CG	ETA Haiphong	9 Nov
MTSENSK (LH)	Soviet	10,107	CG	ETA Haiphong	7 Nov
MYTISCHI (LH)	Soviet	10,107	CG	ETA Haiphong	19 Nov
NIZHNEUDINSK	Soviet	3,726	CG	ETA Haiphong	3 Nov
P. SLAVA (LH)	Soviet	11,089	CG	Dep Black Sea	30 Oct
TYMLAT	Soviet	1,309	CG	ETA Haiphong	7 Nov
<u>In Port</u>					
AMBARCHIK	Soviet	3,360	TK	Arr Haiphong Rds.	29 Oct
ARGUS	Soviet	829	TUG	Cargo: 4,103 MT POL Arr Haiphong Rds.	15 Oct
				Cargo: None	

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<u>NAME OF SHIP</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>GRT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TAT*</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>En Route</u>					
BRATSLAV (LH)	Soviet	11,089	CG		Arr Haiphong Rds. 16 Oct Cargo: 4,198 MT general cargo (about 500 MT identified as paper, newsprint, liquid storage tanks, six wooden crates).
KOCHANOWSKI	Polish	5,731	CG		Arr Haiphong Rds. 20 Oct Cargo: 3,690 MT general cargo (vehicles, grease, machinery, chemicals, and steel products)
LAZAREV	Soviet	3,359	CG	3	Moved to Hon Gai. 28 Oct Cargo: 3,019 MT flour
MANYCH	Soviet	3,726	CG		Arr Haiphong Rds. 27 Oct Cargo: 3,409 MT flour
VZMORYE	Soviet	3,262	CG	3	Moved to Cam Pha Port 28 Oct
AMALIA	Maltese	7,301	CG		Moved to Cam Pha Port 7 Oct
ARDROWAN	UK-HK	7,300	CG		Arr Haiphong Rds. 15 Oct Cargo: 4,075 MT food- stuffs and 1,079 MT general cargo.
NANCY DEE	UK	6,597	CG		Arr Haiphong Rds. 14 Oct Cargo: 2,378 MT general cargo and 300 MT calcium carbide.
ROCHFORD	UK-HK	3,324	CG	5	Moved to Hon Gai 23 Oct
SHUN TAI	UK-HK	7,085	CG		Arr Haiphong Rds. 23 Oct Cargo: 8,000 MT corn/ rice

Departures

ABAGUR	Soviet	3,330	TK	14	Dep Haiphong	26 Oct
BAKURYANI (LH)	Soviet	11,089	CG	31	Dep Haiphong	28 Oct
					vice	18 Oct
IZHMA	Soviet	3,359	CG	16	Dep Haiphong	1 Nov
KURA	Soviet	4,084	REF*	8	Dep Haiphong	31 Oct
POSYET	Soviet	3,455	CG	17	Dep Hon Gai	29 Oct
REVDA	Soviet	3,359	CG	8	Dep Hon Gai	31 Oct
STARFORD	UK-HK	3,464	CG	25	Dep Haiphong	31 Oct
TUNGUSKA	Soviet	3,726	CG	17	Dep Haiphong	29 Oct
WISHFORD	UK-HK	3,464	CG	26	Dep Haiphong	29 Oct

* Abbreviations: CG-Cargo; TK-Tanker; LH-Large Hatch; REF-Refrigerator; TAT-Turnaround Time in Days; MT-Metric Tons; UK-HK/United Kingdom-Hong Kong

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Seaborne petroleum imports rose to 12,462 metric tons in October -- an increase of 6,962 over the previous month. Three Soviet tankers carried all of it except for 384 tons of Hungarian ball-bearing grease brought in by a Polish cargo ship. The October figure was, however, below the average of 15,770 metric tons established during the first nine months of 1967.

So far this year, petroleum imports have totaled 197,466 metric tons, as compared with 200,776 for all of 1966. Communist ships carried 155,309 tons, and Free World ships carried the rest. US air strikes on POL facilities have apparently had little effect on the distribution of POL products.

NR SEABORNE POL IMPORTS TO NORTH VIETNAM IN 1967
(all figures in metric tons)

<u>1967</u>	<u>Soviet</u>	<u>Free World</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>Communist China</u>
Jan	19,362	8,950		
Feb	21,009	2,800		
Mar	24,655	2,800		
Apr	12,545	2,800		498
May	28,513	7,000	169	
Jun	4,043	7,000		
Jul	10,599	3,807	265	
Aug	15,645	7,000		
Sep	5,544			
Oct	12,078		384	
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Total	153,993	42,157	818	498

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
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NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 2 NOV 67

8 IL-28/BEAGLE _____ YUNNANI
LIGHT JET BOMBER
25 MIG-21/FISHBED _____ 21 YUNNANI, 2 PHUC YEN,
JET FIGHTER 2 GIA LAM
70 MIG-15/17/FAGOT/FRESCO _____ 49 YUNNANI, 17 NANNING,
JET FIGHTER 4 GIA LAM
3 UMIG-15/MIDGET _____ YUNNANI
JET TRAINER
24 AN-2/COLT _____ HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI/
LIGHT TRANSPORT YUNNANI AREA AIRFIELDS

38 IL-14/LI-2/ CRATE/CAB _____ HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI, LANG SON
TRANSPORT AREA AIRFIELDS
17 MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND _____ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS AND DISPERSAL AREAS
HELICOPTER PRIMARILY HANOI
4 MI-6/HOOK _____ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS AND
HELICOPTER DISPERSAL AREAS PRIMARILY HANOI
29 PROP TRAINER _____ HANOI/HAIPHONG/ LANG SON
AREA AIRFIELDS
3 AN-24/COKE _____ YUNNANI
TRANSPORT
1 IL-18/COOT _____ CHINA (LAST NOTED NANNING)
TRANSPORT



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NR North Vietnamese Air Situation and Status of Airfields

The estimated North Vietnamese air situation and status of airfields are shown opposite and below.

The future of the North Vietnamese Air Force is uncertain, and Hanoi may again be reevaluating its role.

Since 24 October, the date of the first US air strike on Phuc Yen, some 21 MIGs have left the country; the deployment apparently included the 12 MIG-17s that had probably been delivered from Nanning in China to Gia Lam Airfield the day before (or an equal number of other MIG-17s) and five additional MIG-17s. These 17 aircraft flew to Nanning and are still there. The other fly-outs included two probable MIG-17s and two MIG-21s to Mengtzu, a usual stopping-off field for aircraft en route to Peitun-Yunnani. About 47 MIG-15/17s and 19 MIG-21s were previously believed to be at Peitun-Yunnani. It is therefore estimated that the total North Vietnamese fighter force now in China numbers 87 -- 21 MIG-21s and 66 MIG-15/17s.

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about four MIG-21s and four MIG-17s remain in the country. Two MIG-21s are believed to be at Phuc Yen and two MIG-21s and four MIG-17s at Gia Lam; when operational, Kep is used on a limited basis. The apparent increase in MIG-21s which has occurred over the past few weeks may have resulted from undetected arrivals from China, the assembly of crated aircraft, or the return to service of damaged aircraft.

Since 24 October, six of the eight MIGs left in North Vietnam have made a number of flights between Gia Lam and Kep, possibly to avoid being caught on the ground.

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that a "cooling off" period is in order to divert US attention to other targets, and Hanoi is not likely to order the complete withdrawal of the air force from active operations as it did when the navy experienced offensive failures. The mass return of the force now dispersed in China is not considered likely; no

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North Vietnamese MIGs have been noted flying combat missions from China. It is most likely that a small MIG force will be kept in North Vietnam to maintain a threat.

AIRFIELDS

<u>Airfield</u>	<u>Latest Date Usable Photography</u>	<u>Status</u>
Phuc Yen	28 Oct 67	Serviceable
Kep	30 Oct 67	Unserviceable
Gia Lam	30 Oct 67*	Serviceable*
Kien An	30 Oct 67*	Serviceable*
Cat Bi	30 Oct 67*	Serviceable-Limited*
Hoa Lac	30 Oct 67*	Serviceable*

OTHER SELECTED AIRFIELDS

Yen Bai	29 Oct 67	Under construction; runway being surfaced
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* Field Report

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NR Summary of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam on 2 November

A total of 338 US aircraft conducted strikes against North Vietnamese targets on 2 November.

A Navy A-6A last heard from over North Vietnam is presumed down about 13 nautical miles south-southwest of Hanoi. No beeper was heard.

A USAF O-2A was downed by ground fire 20 nautical miles north-northwest of Dong Ha. His wingman saw the aircraft go into a river; no chute was sighted or beeper heard.

Of these sorties, four were against the following significant targets:

<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>BDA (Pilot Reports)</u>
4	Suspect SAM site	No BDA due to dust and smoke.

Armed Reconnaissance Strike Results

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged/ Cratered/Cut</u>	<u>Struck (No Report)</u>
Bridges	4	13	12
Causeways		1	1
Ferries			2
Ford			1
Highway/road segments		21	
Piers		2	
Railroad rolling stock		2	13
Railroad segments		2	
Railroad yard/siding			1
Transshipment areas			4
Trucks	16	11	31
Truck parks			11
WBL craft	33	42	26
Buildings/structures	27	5	
Bunkers	10	7	2
Field gun positions	6	2	21
Storage areas		4	29
Supply area		1	
Troop concentrations			12

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Soviet Attempts To Impair the US War Effort in Vietnam

The USSR seems to be trying to restrict the US war effort in Vietnam by hinting that hostilities might break out in Korea and by playing down the effects on North Vietnam if the port of Haiphong were mined.

A Soviet at the UN says that the Communist community could react to further US intensification of the Vietnamese war by "starting something in Korea." A rumor that was circulating in an East European capital in late September also concerned preparations that the USSR and North Korea were making to open a second front in Asia.

The Soviet UN source claimed that mining Haiphong harbor would not greatly hinder the flow of arms from the USSR and Eastern Europe to North Vietnam. He added that a year ago such a move would have seriously affected deliveries but that arms were now moving smoothly across Communist China because of the agreement reached by Moscow and Peiping early this year. ~~(SECRET)~~ (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

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
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SUPPLEMENT

**SIGNIFICANT NORTH VIETNAMESE
AIR DEFENSE DEVELOPMENTS**



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[SIGNIFICANT NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE
DEVELOPMENTS, 25-31 OCTOBER]

North Vietnam relied mainly on SAMs and conventional AAA defenses against US air attacks in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas during the week ending 31 October. Despite a record high firing of an estimated 286 missiles, AAA continued to score the most kills. After the raids on Phuc Yen last week, MIG defenses were characterized by interairfield flights within North Vietnam, nonproductive engagements, and the movement of most of the remaining MIGs to the safety of China. SAM units in the DMZ area were again unsuccessful in attempts to down a US B-52, but evidence indicates that they believe one was downed. AAA units in the DMZ area reflected continued interest in receiving 100-mm AAA weapons.

Twelve US aircraft were lost during the week -- eight to AAA and four to SAMs. The North Vietnamese lost four or five MIGs in seven engagements with US aircraft.

AAA Still the Most Effective Defense System

US pilots reported that they encountered medium to heavy AAA fire over the major targets attacked during the week; its accuracy was attested by the eight US aircraft downed.

Intercepted communications reflected continued efforts to move larger caliber 100-mm AAA weapons into the DMZ area. On 23 and 24 October, the movement of 468 rounds of 100-mm ammunition and 24 cases of fuzes to the southern portion of Military Region IV was discussed; on 28 October, 194 more rounds were apparently moved south, according to Thanh Hoa rear services communications.

MIG Activities

MIG activity since the first strike on Phuc Yen Airfield suggests that the role of the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) is being reevaluated. It is possible that the North Vietnamese leadership has decided to remove MIGs from the combat arena, at least as far as any significant participation is concerned.]

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[The loss of Phuc Yen as a sanctuary appears to have seriously disrupted the established MIG operational pattern in which groups of fighters were used to cover selected areas for defense. Reactions after the 24 October attacks on Phuc Yen appeared to be poorly coordinated and lacked the precision seen in the past.

One of two MIG-21s was downed by F-4s on the 26th; the other landed at Kien An or Cat Bai. A few hours later a flight of six to eight MIG-17s made a determined attack against four F-4s; two MIGs were lost and a third was probably destroyed.

During this period, MIGs have been shifted between Gia Lam and Kep -- apparently attempting to avoid air strikes at either base. MIGs have apparently attempted to avoid even reconnaissance aircraft recently, although they were once considered lucrative targets.

The indecisiveness noted in MIG operations and the flight of about 22 MIGs to the safety of Chinese airfields during the week suggest a decision to remove MIGs, at least for the time being, from the defense environment. Whether or not these aircraft will operate from Chinese bases remains to be seen.

Record High SAM Activity

The North Vietnamese achieved a new all-time high for one week's missile firings with 286 launches. Performance was poor, however, with the four US losses representing a 71.5 to 1 effectiveness ratio or a 1.4 per cent chance of success per missile fired. This high rate of fire -- most of which occurred between 25 and 29 October -- may have caused temporary shortages, according to intercepted communications. Activity was noted at 21 sites in the Red River Delta and the DMZ areas.

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Hanoi Claims B-52 Downed Near DMZ

The North Vietnamese not only believed that a SAM shot down a B-52 on 29 October, but they were ready to engage US ground forces in an effort to collect the debris, according to intercepted messages. The DMZ Front Headquarters ordered the 27th Independent Battalion, which is operating south of the DMZ, to obtain material, documents, and pictures of the B-52 wreckage following the launch of three missiles at a flight of B-52s. The Front Headquarters told the unit to "engage the enemy if necessary to obtain the evidence." A change in flight pattern and altitude that causes the contrail to disappear might be interpreted as a kill, particularly if a SAM detonation occurred nearby. Once such a "confirmation" is fed into the reporting system, the North Vietnamese apparently make little effort to verify the data. This apparently holds true for other US air losses and suggests that many of Hanoi's exaggerated claims are more a result of poor reporting procedures than purposeful propaganda.

Optimum Launch Time Discussed

SAM units southwest of Hanoi were noted discussing US approach tactics to targets in the area on 28 October. One speaker said that US flight formations were very disciplined until the target was attacked but that after the strike, discipline was loose. He concluded that the optimum time to launch was while the planes were regrouping. AAA units nearby were told to try to drive US aircraft into missile range when strike groups were inbound. (~~TOP SECRET~~ Sec. 3.3(b) (1))

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